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Ab stract
The anal y sis of the ma jor so ci etal trends and out comes of Ukrai nian
post-so cial ist de vel op ment is pro vided in the ar ti cle. The au thor’s fo cus
is di rected to wards re veal ing of in ter con nec tion be tween the mar ket
shifts, changes of so cial mood, con scious ness and struc ture, in sti tu -
tional qual ity and po lit i cal ac count abil ity. The so cial dy nam ics dur ing
the post-so cial ist ep och, from re vers ing dis place ment in so cial and po -
lit i cal in sti tu tional mat ter at the end of 1990s to wards ex plo sion of so -
cial ex pec ta tions at the line of 2004-2005 and the fol low ing mass dis -
ap point ment which ac com pa nies the in creas ing con tem po rary po lit i cal
de reg u la tion is con sid ered from the point of view of search for an swers
in re gard to the per spec tive fea tures of Ukrai nian de vel op ment.
Over the last sev eral years, Ukraine has found it self in the fo cus of at -
ten tion of re mote coun tries, which sur prised Ukrai ni ans them selves.
View ers in many coun tries could watch the un usual po lit i cal “shows”: the 
Or ange Rev o lu tion, the “gas war” with Rus sia at the end of 2005 and be -
gin ning of 2006, the ne go ti a tions af ter the par lia men tary elec tions of
2006, mixed with tragi comic el e ments, on cre at ing a gov ern ing ma jor ity
in par lia ment… Does all this mean that we see the “su per no vas” of de moc -
racy flar ing up on the dim ming sky of Eu ro pean pol i tics? Or is it just an -
other sign of how so cial re al i ties are be com ing in creas ingly vir tual, grad u -
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ally yield ing to forms of “ex pres sion”? Or might it be a sign that in the new
twist of the de vel op ment of cap i tal ism, the busi ness elite and new mid dle
class have “re volted”? Con sid er ation of the fac tors and ways of Ukrai nian
trans for ma tion in its past and pres ent state, which is board ing of the fur -
ther de vel op ment of the so ci ety, is the task of this ar ti cle. 
In Re verse Shift from a Chaos to wards the So cial Or der
We can not com pre hend the so cial and po lit i cal pro cesses go ing on in
Ukraine with out be com ing fa mil iar with the road lead ing to the Or ange
Rev o lu tion, the im me di ate pre lim i nar ies to the pe cu liar events that fol -
lowed it, and the spe cial fea tures of the tran si tion pe riod of the coun try.
The unique his tor i cal sit u a tion of re stor ing cap i tal ism, the sys temic de -
tach ment from to tal con trol of the dis in te grat ing So viet Em pire, and the
feel ing of lib er a tion trig gered by all this, gen er ated his tor i cal op ti mism.
There has been an eu phoric be lief in the suc cess of the up com ing dem o -
cratic and mar ket tran si tion — not only in Ukraine, but also in the rest of 
the post-com mu nist coun tries. 
How ever, even in the first years of post-com mu nist de vel op ment, a
cri sis of the econ omy, de te ri o ra tion of liv ing stan dards and qual ity of life, 
and fail ure of hopes for quick pros per ity — all this trig gered mass dis ap -
point ment. There was dis rup tion of be liefs and hopes, and a rad i cal
change in the gen eral so cial and po lit i cal mood. All the signs im plied
that the mac ro eco nomic and so cial shock was an in ev i ta ble con se -
quence of the sud den in sti tu tional changes in econ omy and struc tural
changes in so ci ety. How ever, the depth and per sis tence of the shock were
dif fer ent in the var i ous coun tries. Ukraine ex pe ri enced things dif fer -
ently from the oth ers. In this eco nomic di sas ter, Ukraine lost 60% of its
gross do mes tic prod uct mea sured in 1989 (and hit bot tom in 1998), in
Rus sia the loss amounted to 45% (bot tomed in 1998 too). In Po land,
how ever, the loss to taled 18% at worst (bot tom in 1991), and in the Czech 
Re pub lic 13% (the bot tom was in 1993)1.
Ukraine “broke the re cord” not only in the de crease of GDP, but also in
the de te ri o ra tion of in dus try and in dus trial em ploy ment2. The eco nomic
re ces sion was ac com pa nied by a spec tac u lar in crease in so cial dispari-
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ties. It po lar ized the pop u la tion in terms of in come and fi nan cial  capabi -
li ties. The mea sure of po lar iza tion dif fered from coun try to coun try. In
the 1990s, in come dis par i ties dou bled in Ukraine com pared to the  pre -
vious de cade (as they did in Rus sia). In the Czech Re pub lic, Hun gary
and Po land, the so cial dif fer en ti a tion was much more mod er ate [3,
p. 41]. In Ukraine, a level of in come in equal ity mea sured by the Gini co ef -
fi cient in the mid-nine ties has in creased al most two times since the end
of the 1980s and ranked 47-48 (like in Rus sia), while in Czech, Hun gary
and Po land such in creas ing ap peared to be not so much jeop ar diz ing —
the Gini in dex has risen only by 2–7 points. In those three coun tries, a
rel a tive bal anc ing of so cial dis par i ties was due to the gov ern ments reg u -
lat ing the pro cesses of tran si tion, in an ef fort to mit i gate the so cial losses 
of re forms. In Ukraine, as in Rus sia, the gov ern ments only took mea -
sures aimed at sta bi li za tion when the so cial and eco nomic cri sis started
to de velop into a real di sas ter.
The lack of an eco nomic re form strat egy con sid er ably in creased re -
gional asym me tries within the coun try. In 1990, the per ca pita gross re -
gional prod uct of the rich est re gion in Ukraine was 159% com pared to
the fig ure of the weak est. In 1996, this fig ure went up to 268%. In 2004,
the re gional dis par i ties be came stun ning — 658%, or two and a half
times more than in 1996. In 1996, the per ca pita prod uct of the city of
Kyiv was 1.4 times more than the av er age for Ukraine. In 2004, it was 3.2
times more [5]. The sharp en ing in ter re gional so cial and eco nomic dis -
par i ties have been destabilizing Ukrai nian so ci ety. They in crease po lit i -
cal and so cial frag men ta tion and jeop ar dize the unity of the coun try.
Con tra dic tions, as well as their uti li za tion for po lit i cal pur poses, could
be ob served. In the first stage of the Or ange Rev o lu tion, steps were taken
to en sure the “sov er eignty” of the East ern and South ern re gions of Uk -
raine. Those mea sures were ini ti ated by the Party of Re gions, with Viktor 
Yanukovych as its head.
In 1992, the pri vat iza tion of small and large en ter prises started by
open ten der. Be tween 1995 and 1999, the pro cess of mass pri vat iza tion
by vouch ers evolved. Pri vat iza tion gave a boost to pri vate ini tia tives,
which was one of the im por tant rea sons why the coun try re cov ered from
the deep struc tural re ces sion at the end of the 1990s. At the same time,
de spite ex pec ta tions, the mil lions of Ukrai nian cit i zens par tic i pat ing in
the voucher pri vat iza tion did not be come ac tual own ers1. Cash-free pri-
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vatization re sulted in in sid ers get ting the most from the as sets, which
caused slow growth in de mand for in sti tu tional mar ket re forms. On the
other hand, the lack of de vel oped mar ket in sti tu tions re sulted in a sit u a -
tion where as sets be came con cen trated in the hands of a few in sid ers with 
po lit i cal con nec tions, through trans ac tions in the sec ond ary mar ket [7,
p. 17]. The “redistributional co ali tions” (M. Olson’s term) were very quick -
ly es tab lished on this ba sis1, the crys tal li za tion of which re sulted in eco -
nomic dom i nance of a few large busi ness-po lit i cal oli gar chic groups. 
Against this back ground, apoc a lyp tic vi sions2 and a de cline in moral
stan dards [19] started to be come wide spread phe nom ena in so ci ety as
early as in 1993. So ci ety be came deeply alien ated from power and the
state. The power gave “a free hand” to redistributional co ali tions, con sol i -
dated through pri vate in ter ests, and gave lat i tude to pro cesses of the state 
cap ture [9]. Pri vate own ers cap tured the as sets of the state, de fin ing the
rules of the game them selves and re ly ing on state of fi cials and pol i ti cians
on their pay roll. Busi ness pen e trated into pol i tics. The “cap ture of the
state through pri vat iza tion” led not only to the for ma tion of new large, me -
dium and small en tre pre neur ship classes. It also streng th ened and re -
pro duced the high so cial sta tus of rep re sen ta tives of the for mer no men -
cla ture and their bu reau cratic net work. In the case of Ukraine, it is safe to
say that the 1990s saw the new no men cla ture rev o lu tion. This re sulted in
the con ver sion of po lit i cal and so cial cap i tal of the for mer no men cla ture
into eco nomic cap i tal. The for mer no men cla ture now used the eco nomic
cap i tal to pen e trate (back) into sta ble po lit i cal po si tions.
At the be gin ning of the 1990s, West ern ad vis ers em phat i cally fo cused 
on the neoliberal ver sion of mar ket tran si tion. The na scent in sti tu tions
of mar ket and de moc racy also im plied that. This was sup posed to sub -
due the tra di tional con di tions, a leg acy of the So viet sys tem, de tach ing
power from prop erty, and busi ness from the ex er cise of po lit i cal power
and ad min is tra tion. How ever, this sup pres sion and de tach ment did not
ma te ri al ize. That was pri mar ily be cause, al though the Ukrai nian re -
forms of the 1990s cre ated a for mal mar ket and de moc racy, it was not
the prod uct of civil so ci ety de vel oped through his tor i cal evo lu tion. It did
not orig i nate from a spe cific cul ture, in which cit i zens take a stand for
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Ac cord ing to the na tional opin ion sur veys, such was the pub lic mood un til the end of the 1990s,
and it was the stron gest be tween 1994 and 1998 [10].
lib erty and prop erty, pri vacy and the in ter ests of self-or ga niz ing com mu -
ni ties, while also es tab lish ing the mech a nism of im ple ment ing these in -
ter ests. Civil ac tiv ity, trust in in sti tu tions, power and de moc racy could
only be ob served in Ukraine for a short time, at the very be gin ning of the
1990s. From as early as 1993 — par a dox i cally, just when the pro ce dural
forms of de moc racy were con sol i dated — one could ob serve fast de te ri o -
ra tion of these in di ca tors.
The data of the an nual na tional mon i tor ing con ducted by the In sti -
tute of So ci ol ogy of the Na tional Acad emy of Sci ences of Ukraine (IS
NASU) in di cated that in 1994, the in dex of trust for de moc racy and its
po lit i cal in sti tu tions (such as the head of state, par lia ment, gov ern ment) 
was be tween 2.1–2.3, where 5 would in di cate full trust and 1 in di cates
full dis trust. Up un til mid-2004, this in di ca tor only showed slight vari a -
tion, and prac ti cally had not changed1 [10, p. 30]. 
The elite and the new lead ing po lit i cal-eco nomic class dis guised its
in ter ests be hind the rhet o ric of de moc racy. But in fact, they were in tent
on en sur ing their dom i nance in power and prop erty. The in ter ests of the
elite de fined the rules of the game, so that they could cap ture the most
im por tant po si tions of the po lit i cal arena, and use the state and its cor -
rupt ible mech a nism to cap ture the for mer as sets of the state. The var i -
ous forms of rental rooted in cor rup tion, cou pled with in ten si fy ing struc -
tural im bal ances, con tinue to sup press the mar kets, and also have the
ef fect of sub du ing the ac tiv i ties of pri vate en tre pre neurs striv ing for real
de moc racy. The in ter est of the groups rak ing in dis pro por tion ate rents is
to sus tain this source of in come, and, nat u rally, to block fur ther dem o -
cratic and mar ket re forms. The “You scratch my back and I’ll scratch
yours” in for mal re la tion ships, char ac ter is tic of the fi nal stage of So viet
so ci ety, were car ried over to the new rules. What is more, the new rules
be came even tougher and more cyn i cal.
The huge al li ances of large in dus tri al ists, big en tre pre neurs, bank ers 
and post-no men cla ture lead ing elites brought me dia sources — among
oth ers — un der their con trol. Their in ter ests called for the res to ra tion of
an au thor i tar ian po lit i cal re gime. The re dis tri bu tion (cap ture) of prop er -
ty had to be im ple mented quickly and ef fi ciently, avoid ing com pe ti tion
with large mul ti na tional cor po ra tions, which could only be done in a
strict au thor i tar ian-pa tron iz ing sys tem. For ex am ple, when the com pa -
nies of “Ukrrudprom”, the big gest ex ploit ers and pro ces sors of ore, were
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pri vat ized, Ukraine had to ac cept ac com plished facts, with out any pre vi -
ous dis cus sion.
At the same time, in the be gin ning of the 1990s, and then be tween
1998–2000, at tempts of the na tional po lit i cal elite to mod ern ize the po lit i -
cal sys tem dis re garded the fact that the in dus trial-fi nan cial groups need -
ed a sys tem of “guard ian ship and con trol”. Thus, these large cap i tal ist
groups backed up an anti-dem o cratic and anti-mar ket agenda. It is no
sur prise that the first po lit i cal force around which the Ukrai nian fi nan cial 
and in dus trial groups con cen trated was the Com mu nist Party of Ukrai ne.
The po lit i cal strug gle for power, cap ture of po lit i cal and ad min is tra tive
con trol over mar ket com pet i tors, and the pri vat iza tion of the  re main ing
stra te gic as sets of the state, as well as the strug gle for con trol of the loy alty
of cit i zens, took in creas ingly tough forms in Ukrai nian  society. 
The in sti tu tional changes were sig nif i cantly de pend ent, on the one
hand, on the in ter ests of pow er ful fi nan cial-in dus trial and busi ness-po -
lit i cal groups. On the other hand, ow ing to the ste reo types, life rules and
knee-jerk re ac tions rooted in the past, the changes could not serve as
ap pro pri ate guide lines for de moc ra ti za tion and mar ket re forms. In fact,
they were des tined to be coun ter-ef fec tive. They re sulted in the re pro duc -
tion and con sol i da tion of the au thor i tar ian-pa ter nal is tic po lit i cal and eco -
nomic sys tem.
In sti tu tional in ef fi ciency was be com ing more and more ob vi ous. Par -
tic u larly, this fact was re flected by in di ca tors of GDP per ca pita, of a part
of in for mal econ omy in GDP, of a level of po lit i cal sta bil ity, as well as
 govern ment ef fec tive ness, etc. — see Ta ble 1. 
Ta ble 1
In sti tu tional Qual ity: Ukraine and Rus sia Com pared, 2002–2005
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Ukraine  47.2 Lowermid dle 1,260 52.2 37.9 28.4
–0.59
year/
–0.86 %
Rus sian
Fed er a tion 143.0
Higher
mid dle 3,410 46.1 21.8 48.1
–3.57
year /
–5.16 %
Sources: [11; 12; 13]. 
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Among 19 coun tries of the Cen tral and East ern Eu rope in 2005
Ukraine re mained to be one of the poor est coun tries at that be ing the
most pop u lated one. Gov ern ment ef fec tive ness, sup port ing busi ness, as 
well as rule of law ranked at the very low level (see Ta ble 2).
Ta ble 2
Dif fer ences in Eco nomic Re form Re sults:
Ukraine, Rus sia and Hun gary Com pared
Prog ress
in re forms
(World Bank,
1996 )
Po lit i cal and busi ness en vi ron ment
Gov ern ment
ef fec tive ness
(GE)
Reg u la tory
qual ity
(RQ)
Rule of law
(RL)
Ukraine
The fourth group
(the slow est re -
forms)
–0.74 –0.62 –0.79
Rus sian
Fed er a tion
The third group
(“back ward”) –0.40 –0.30 –0.78
Hun gary The first group(“ad vanced”)  0.78  1.21  0.90
Sources: [12; 13]
Given these cir cum stances, deep dis sat is fac tion ac cu mu lated in
wide groups of so ci ety to ward the ex ist ing re gime. A de mand for change
ap peared, in a wide so cial en vi ron ment that was prac ti cally alien ated
from own er ship and sources of in flu ence. The po ten tial for pro test and
neg a tive so cial mo bi li za tion in creased (Ta ble 3).
At the be gin ning of the 2000s, en tre pre neurs (es pe cially small and
me dium en ter prises op er at ing in the com mer cial and me di a tion sec tor,
highly trained ex perts and pro fes sion als) started to ar tic u late their in -
ter ests more and more em phat i cally. Dis sat is fac tion in the world of large
en tre pre neurs also in ten si fied, ow ing to ex po sure to po lit i cal cy cles and
high “taxes” ex pected in ex change for loy alty of pub lic au thor i ties. So cial 
re sis tance gained strength among the com pet ing po lit i cal-eco nomic
groups. It also grew be tween, on the one hand, the emerg ing mid dle
class, con sist ing of own ers of small and me dium en ter prises, highly
trained pro fes sion als and rep re sen ta tives of large cor po ra tions, and on
the other hand, the struc tures of power aim ing to con trol the ac tiv i ties of
the for mer. The lat ter forced the for mer to “by pass” the rules, which was
one of their ways to elicit “rental”.
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Ta ble 3
Pro test Po ten tial of the Ukrai ni ans
in case of Breach of the Civil Rights and In ter ests, 1994–2005
(Mul ti ple Choices, N = 1800–1810 per Year of a Sur vey*)
In di ca tors
of pro test
po ten tial
Years of sur vey
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005
At ti tudes to
 poli tical party
mem ber ship,
%
 0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.9  1.5  0.8  1.7  2.2  1.9  2.5
Con ven tional
pro test po ten -
tial in dex**, %
16.4 15.9 13.9 12.1 18.2 20.2 19.1 22.3 17.4 20.5 27.5
Non-con ven -
tio nal pro test
po ten tial in -
dex**, %
 2.9  3.1  3.1  2.9  4.3  3.9  3.7  4.6  2.7  2.2  4.0
Un will ing ness 
to take part in
any form of
pro test, %
31.9 36.9 33.5 37.3 29.8 29.9 34.2 30.3 37.1 36.6 25.2
Destabiliza -
tion in dex of
pro test po ten -
tial***, %
 3.2  3.2  3.0  2.9  4.2  4.0  3.7  4.6  3.0  2.6  4.6
* The at ti tudes to ward pro test be hav ior were not mea sured in the 2003 Sur vey.
** The in dexes of con ven tional and non-con ven tional pro test were cal cu lated as an av er -
age mean ing of a per cent of the cor re spond ing pro test forms per year (max i mum is
100%).
*** Ac cord ing to ex pert in ter views (by N. Panina).
Source: [10, p. 40].
Re search at the be gin ning of the 2000s in di cated that po lit i cal ac tiv -
ity of the youth in creased. The young gen er a tion par tic i pated in de moc -
racy de vel op ment and self-gov ern ing pro grams in schools and uni ver si -
ties, and got their first ex pe ri ence in dem o cratic life by par tic i pat ing in
role-play ing games. Con fron ta tion ex ist ing in so ci ety prac ti cally alien -
ated peo ple from op por tu ni ties of in flu ence, and the rep re sen ta tives of
the power struc tures. This con fron ta tion was be com ing sig nif i cantly
more com plex be cause of split be tween the Ukrai nian po lit i cal-eco no -
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mic elites. There was also an ex ter nal strug gle for in flu ence over Ukraine
be tween Rus sia and the West. The lat ter meant, on the one hand, the US
with its ex pan sion ist geopolitical approach, and on the other hand the
European Union, with its more moderate position.
Re gard less of po lit i cal alien ation of the “si lent ma jor ity”, the ex pe ri -
ences of the Ukrai nian elec tion cam paigns of 1999–2002 in creas ingly
dem on strated that po lit i cal par tic i pa tion and dem o cratic con trol of po -
wer had drawn the at ten tion in so ci ety. De spite per ma nent and se ri ous
eco nomic and so cial dif fi cul ties, cit i zens of Ukraine showed a fairly high
level of in ter est in ac tiv i ties of the po lit i cal and power bod ies, thereby
dem on strat ing a sig nif i cant ef fort to ac com plish lib erty. The pres i den tial 
elec tions of 2004 be came a cat a lyst in the mo bi li za tion of Ukrai nian so -
ci ety. Ac cord ing to a sur vey con ducted by the Razumkov Re search Cen -
ter at the end of 2003, 71% of the adult pop u la tion of Ukraine took some
ac tion with a view to the pres i den tial elec tions bring ing about a rad i cal
po lit i cal change of di rec tion. With a low level of trust in the in sti tu tions of 
de moc racy, the cit i zens of Ukraine had very strong per sonal feel ings
about the pres i den tial elec tions of 2004. Many be lieved it would be an
im por tant event whose out come may im prove not only the gen eral sit u a -
tion in the coun try, but also in their own fam i lies. In part, these ex pec ta -
tions may be the rea son why the vot ers be came so po lar ized along prin ci -
ples in the presidential elections of 2004, standing by their preferred
candidates, on the basis of “there is no third option”. 
The in ten si fi ca tion of con fron ta tion be tween so cial and po lit i cal-eco -
nomic forces, open cyn i cism dem on strated by the ac tiv i ties of the gov -
ern ing forces, high ex pec ta tions at tached to the pres i den tial elec tions of
2004 and a dan ger of non-ful fill ment of these el e vated ex pec ta tions — all 
this to gether led to a so cial ex plo sion. One of the signs con firm ing this
no tion is that so ci ety man aged to over come its de feat ism. Among peo ple
polled by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy (IS NASU), 33% be lieved that in the
days of the Or ange Rev o lu tion, po lit i cal ac tiv ity of the cit i zens had been
mostly driven by pro test against the gov ern ing power. They agreed with
the state ment that it was a “con scious strug gle of cit i zens united for the
defense of their rights” [10, p. 149]. 
Or ange Rev o lu tion and Its Af ter math:
Myths and Dis il lu sion ment
The events of the Or ange Rev o lu tion proved a line of par ti tion in Ukrai -
nian so ci ety, the cross ing of which changed so ci ety ir re vers ibly. So ci ety
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started to be lieve in its own power, and an ex plo sive change took place in
civil iden tity, na tional aware ness, po lit i cal mo bi li za tion and re struc tur ing. 
For long years, af ter the dis in te gra tion of the So viet Un ion, many
Ukrai nian cit i zens felt they were at cross roads. Their aware ness of iden -
tity was un cer tain and am biv a lent. Ac cord ing to the Na tional Sur vey in
1994, 47% of Ukrai ni ans stated that in a hy po thet i cal new ref er en dum
on sov er eignty, they would vote against the in de pend ence of Ukraine as a 
state. Only 24% would have voted once again for a sov er eign Ukraine [14, 
p. 3]. The sit u a tion had not changed by 2003. But at the end of 2004, the
pic ture changed com pletely. In 2001, ac cord ing to the mon i tor ing sur vey 
of the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy (NAS of Ukraine), 35% of the polled con sid -
ered them selves cit i zens of Ukraine first and fore most. In 2005, 55%
iden ti fied them selves as Ukrai nian cit i zens. In 2005, 79% of polled Uk -
rai ni ans said that if they had a chance to choose an other coun try, they
would still opt for Ukraine as their home land [10, pp. 72, 149]. This sug -
gests a uniquely high level of na tional aware ness, con sid er ing that
Ukraine has been a sov er eign state for only 15 years. Ukrai nian na tional
aware ness started to in crease no tice ably from 2003. Con sid er ation of
Ukraine as the re spon dent’s own home land grew from 2004. Over the
last 14-15 years, 2005 was the first year when the ma jor ity of cit i zens felt 
the Ukrai nian state was re ally in de pend ent. The re port of Free dom
House for 2006 con firmed this phe nom e non by clas si fy ing Ukraine as a
“free coun try” for the first time [15]. Ow ing to the Or ange Rev o lu tion, a
non-class-based ideo log i cal par ti tion emerged in so ci ety, which di vided
the coun try into two al most iden ti cal parts in geo graph ical terms, but to
a lesser ex tent, also in terms of gen er a tions. The sup port or re jec tion of
the Or ange Rev o lu tion and af fil i a tion with po lit i cal par ties act ing in it
was a sign of this par ti tion. This par ti tion car ries sig nif i cant so cial risks. 
Hav ing said that, the cre ation of aware ness of these pro cesses sig ni fies a
shift in principal importance for Ukrainian society. That affects not so
much the political-economic, but more the civil, mental and po lit i cal-
 cul tural conditions.
The events of the Or ange Rev o lu tion swept away the one-sid ed ness of
the new au thor i tar ian sys tem that was gain ing strength. This gave a
chance to lib er al ize the Ukrai nian re gime, but only a chance. So ci ety and
pol i tics are on the ra zor’s edge, amid con tin u ously sharp po lit i cal strug gle 
and mass “post-rev o lu tion ary” dis il lu sion ment. In sum mer 2005, the in -
com pe tence of the new gov ern ing power and its in ten tion to find im me di -
ate so lu tions to deeply rooted po lit i cal and eco nomic prob lems by mass
re place ment of cad res played a very neg a tive role in this move ment. Eco -
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nomic and po lit i cal de ci sions were not com pat i ble with rev o lu tion ary pre -
sen ta tion. The mir a cle failed to ma te ri al ize. In ad di tion, ow ing to the ex -
tremely pop u list ac tions of Yuliia Tymoshenko, the state once again found 
it self on the verge of an eco nomic cri sis. The “rev o lu tion ary” re dis tri bu tion 
of prop erty, in flu ence and cad res, the re jec tion of the for merly ac cepted
nor ma tive acts af fect ing tax a tion and free eco nomic zones, the ex trem ist
ac tions in re la tions with Rus sia and sev eral sim i lar phe nom ena brought
about the real dan ger of state bank ruptcy. 
The “rev o lu tion ary ide als” de gen er ated into a farce. So ci ety re acted
very quickly. The gen eral po lit i cal at mo sphere al tered. Pub lic trust in the 
“or ange po lit i cal lead ers”, es pe cially in Uschenko and Tymoshenko,
started drop ping as early as Au gust 2005. The trust cap i tal of the op po -
si tion Party of Re gions and its leader Yanukovych, started to in crease. In
spring 2005, data of the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy showed that 41% of Ukrai -
ni ans “sup ported and con tinue to sup port lead ers of the Or ange Rev o lu -
tion”. In spring 2006, that dropped to 29%. At the same time, the pro por -
tion of those who “did not sup port and do not sup port lead ers of the Or -
ange Rev o lu tion” in creased from 27% to 39%. Ow ing to the Or ange Rev o -
lu tion, in 2005, 32% of cit i zens felt they were win ners and only 12% con -
sid ered them selves los ers. By 2006, these pro por tions had been re -
versed to 16% ver sus 35% [10, p. 85]. Opin ion polls at the time of the par -
lia men tary elec tion cam paign of 2006 dem on strated that the so ci ety
was deeply dis ap pointed with the “new” power, mostly re gard ing its pro -
fes sion al ism, hon esty and aware ness of re spon si bil ity. This dis ap point -
ment was felt not only by the new leaders’ political adversaries, but
recently in the group of their supporters as well.
So ci ety and the po lit i cal sphere in to tal had been re struc tured1. There 
was no need for the ad vent of “new heroes”. Who ever would come to
power as a re sult of the par lia men tary elec tions, would cer tainly have to
form a “wide” co ali tion. In this sit u a tion, it be came prac ti cally in sig nif i -
cant which party would re ceive the most votes in the elec tions at the end
of March 2006. The abil ity to make com pro mises and cre ate a co ali tion
be came much more im por tant. The ro man tic rev o lu tion ary ide als yiel d -
ed to hard-nosed prag ma tism, not only in po lit i cal elites, but also in so -
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At the end of the year 2005, seven par ties and groups went to the top of the list, leav ing far be -
hind some 40 other po lit i cal groups that tried to re serve their place in the elec toral com pe ti tion.
Five po lit i cal forces passed the test of elec tions in March 2006, in the fol low ing dis tri bu tion: The
Party of Re gions led by Viktor Yanukovych, Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc, the “Our Ukraine Bloc” or ga -
nized around the Pres i dent, the So cial ist Party of Ukraine and the Com mu nist Party of Ukraine.
ci ety. The peo ple at tached new hopes to the par lia men tary elec tions in
the spring of 2006, but this time based on absolutely practical ideas.
Once again, the in ter ests of the large in dus trial-fi nan cial, busi ness-
 po lit i cal cir cles started dom i nat ing the po lit i cal pro cesses. The po lit i cal
and eco nomic down turn that had de vel oped by 2005, as well as the lack
of ca pa bil ity and readi ness of the new power to em bark on a con struc tive
di a logue, en cour aged the fi nan cial-in dus trial groups to step up their po -
lit i cal ac tiv i ties sig nif i cantly once again. The same was done by the large
cap i tal ists, most of whom con sid ered them selves “los ers” ow ing to the
Or ange Rev o lu tion. The pol icy of Tymoshenko’s gov ern ment also con -
trib uted to this pro cess. In fact, fi nan cial-in dus trial groups be came the
de ter min ing par tic i pants of the par lia men tary elec tions of March 2006.
The un fin ished rev o lu tion went on, but — as we know from his tory — in
the genre of irony or farce. At the end of May 2006, the fol low ing fac tions
were set up in the Ukrai nian par lia ment (a to tal of 450 man dates):
(1) Party of Re gions (Viktor Yanukovych) — 186 man dates; (2) Yuliia
Tymoshenko Bloc, com pris ing two po lit i cal par ties, All-Ukrai nian Un ion 
“Fa ther land”, or “Bat’kivschyna” and Ukrai nian So cial Dem o cratic Par -
ty — 129 man dates; (3) The “Our Ukraine Bloc”, con tain ing six par ties
(Peo ple’s Un ion “Our Ukraine”, Ukrai nian Peo ple’s Party, Party of In dus -
tri al ists and En tre pre neurs, Con gress of Ukrai nian Na tion al ists, Ukrai -
nian Re pub li can Party As sem bly, or “Sobor”, Christian Democratic
Union) — 81; (4) Socialist Party of Ukraine — 33; (5) Communist Party of
Ukraine — 21 mandates.
In the par lia men tary stale mate that de vel oped, it is im pos si ble to
form a ma jor ity. At the same time, some kind of ma jor ity should be
formed, in or der to en able the mere op er a tion of par lia ment and gov ern -
ment, as well as to al low the busi ness cir cles op er at ing their cap i tal in -
vested in pol i tics. Some kind of co ali tion was needed. And what ever co -
ali tion re sulted, it would have to be one of “ad ver sar ies” (com pet i tors).
The risk of the in di vid ual con fig u ra tion in par lia ment has be come a mat -
ter of prin ci pal im por tance. In other words, who will carry the risk and
who will en joy the ben e fits? The block of for mer “or ange po lit i cal forces”
that came to power but now are lack ing in ter nal con sen sus? Or big cap i -
tal, which put new po lit i cal “ad ver sar ies” on its fa cade? Or perhaps the
players of foreign policy? Or society and the state in total? 
In con sid er ation of the struc ture of po lit i cal power, the new con fig u ra -
tion in par lia ment is not only in flu enced by par ties’ ideo log i cal or the o -
ret i cal in com pat i bil ity (such dif fer ences are more or less ex pressed only
in the case of the Com mu nist and the So cial ist Party), but much more by
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the con tin u ing strug gle of the busi ness in ter est groups back ing up these 
po lit i cal forces, seek ing to cap ture the re sources1. This was one of the
rea sons for the de lay in co ali tion talks. This se ries of com e dies lasted
from April to July 2006. An other par a dox of Ukrai nian pol i tics also man -
i fested it self. Ul ti mately, the po lit i cal games played with the in volve ment
of in ter est groups within the par lia ment and busi ness-po lit i cal in ter est
groups pro duced the same re sult that was de jure ex pressed by vot ers as
their in ten tion in the elec tions of March 2006. The po lit i cal forces that
oc cu pied the place of the party in power and the lead ing op po si tion party, 
as al ter na tive op tions to each other, were the ones that per formed the
best in the elec tions: the Party of Re gions and Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc.
All the other forces in parliament had the role of a necessary but sup -
port ing actor.
The for ma tion of the co ali tion car ries an im por tant les son in de moc -
racy. The only way to have mean ing ful talks is to use the path des ig nated
by im por tant eco nomic-po lit i cal in ter ests. From the Homo Ludens con -
cept of Johan Huizinga, we know that even im pos si ble games have to be
fol lowed through. The par a dox i cal fea ture of a game is that new hab its
and rules are cre ated through it. The per spec tive of cre at ing a so ci ety of
sol i dar ity on the ba sis of na tional and civil iden ti fi ca tion was in vented
and be came re al is tic in this game, set ting up a “bridge” be tween
Left-bank and Right-bank Ukraine. (Ukraine is di vided into two parts by
the Dnie per River in a geo graph ical sense, and this di vi sion is con nected
to pol i tics as well.) At the same time, de spite the dem o cratic shop win -
dow put up to dis guise the co ali tion and gov ern ment ne go ti a tions, and
even de spite signs of ac tual de moc ra ti za tion in Ukraine, once again the
elites are the lead ing ech e lons in so cial trans for ma tion. Social ness (a
term of Habermas) is only a “viewer”, an ob server of the pro cesses. This
par a dox applies not only to Ukrainian politics, but also to the de ve l op -
ment of democracy as such. 
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As has been stated by, among oth ers, jour nal ists of the Korrespondent [17] by now it has be -
come ob vi ous that Sys tem Cap i tal Man age ment, a com pany owned by bil lion aire Rinat Akhmetov, 
which is the larg est hold ing en ter prise in Ukraine, and which sup ported the Party of Re gions ac -
tively (in clud ing the head of the party, who be came the Prime Min is ter once again), in tends to
break the mo nop oly of “RosUkrEnergo” in Ukraine’s nat u ral gas mar ket, to win the pri vat iza tion of
“Ukrtelekom”, the larg est tele com mu ni ca tion com pany, and would re vise the con cen tra tion of
large met al lur gi cal com pa nies. “Gazprom” tar geted chem i cal com pa nies for ac qui si tion. Some one 
else set their eyes on gas and oil fields, some one else on the state bud get — and ev ery body
jumped on ar a ble land.
Per spec tives of De vel op ment or a Dead lock?
Some Con clud ing Re marks
A per ma nent po lit i cal and gov ern men tal cri sis has had its ebbs and
tides from the end of 2004 up to now. No one can iden tify a co her ent con -
cept of eco nomic pol icy in the ac tiv i ties of the Ukrai nian gov ern ment,
and this has al ways been the case in the last 15 years since Ukraine
gained its in de pend ence. How ever, the econ omy of Ukraine con tin ues to
pro duce re mark able growth.
This growth started at the turn of 1999-2000. By 2004, the surge in
GDP had ex ceeded 12%. Af ter an abrupt halted in the first half of 2005,
in the next pe riod the econ omy started to ac cel er ate, and con tin ues to do 
so. In 2006, spec tac u lar pos i tive mac ro eco nomic shifts oc curred. They
in cluded: (a) the growth rate of cap i tal in vest ments com pared to GDP
growth more than dou bled (12.2%); (b) the rev e nue trends of the state
bud get im proved; (c) in fla tion was the low est among CIS coun tries at
3.8%, while real house hold in come grew by 20%, i.e. real wages grew by
22.9%; (d) whole sale and re tail trade turn over ex panded by more than
the growth of GDP, which was not com mon in the pre vi ous years [2; 12].
These struc tural changes so lid ify and in crease value changes in the
mindset of Ukrai nian cit i zens. In the re sults of re search con ducted by the
Razumkov Re search Cen ter, we can dis cover one of the signs of this shift.
The ques tion was: “What should be your pri or ity, given the re stricted
 opportunities of the Ukrai nian state bud get?” There were two an swers:
(1) the state should sup port peo ple in a dis ad van ta geous po si tion, who
are un able to work, with wel fare sup port, sub si dies, etc.; (2) the state
should sup port peo ple ca pa ble of work ing by rais ing their wages, cre at ing
jobs and sup port ing small and me dium en ter prises. At the end of 2003,
64% of re spon dents chose the first op tion and 33% the sec ond. At the end
of 2004, this ra tio changed to 48% ver sus 33%. By De cem ber 2005, the
ra tio had been re versed: 33% chose the first op tion and 64% the sec ond
[10]. In other words, al most two-thirds of cit i zens ex pect work, rather than 
wel fare sup port. This is an im por tant sign of a Eu ro pean at ti tude — one
re lies on con tri bu tion of the in di vid ual,  auto nomy and fair wages. 
The lat est par lia men tary elec tions have strength ened changes in the
gen eral pref er ences of po lit i cal par ties. The com mu nist ideal had failed,
and the po si tions of the Com mu nist Party were prac ti cally elim i nated.
Ow ing to an in ter nal cri sis that had rip ened over a long pe riod, the in flu -
ence of the So cial ist Party di min ished, fol low ing the strug gle that be gan
in 1997-1998 be tween pro-com mu nist nos tal gia and the “new  demo -
cracy” pol icy of the So cial Dem o crats. The par ties that grew out of the So -
cial-Dem o cratic cra dle are now scat tered all over the po lit i cal arena. The
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neo-clas si cal ver sions of con ser va tive-bour geois par ties (the Party of Re -
gions, the “party of affluents” as one of its lead ers, Ye. Kushnaryov, called 
it) have gained strength, but they still play on post-com mu nist nos tal gia. 
The in flu ence of po lit i cal forces fo cus ing on na tional-cul tural re newal
has de creased sig nif i cantly. The po lit i cal in ter ests of par ties have shifted 
from the ex treme points of the left-right scale to ward the cen ter1. 
Par a dox i cally, fa vor able changes in struc ture and sys tem of val ues ex -
ac er bate the eco nomic and so cial pol icy di lem mas of the new Ukrai nian
gov ern ment. What should be done to en sure not only con tin ued im prove -
ment of in di ca tors, but also a sys tem atic growth of econ omy and wel fare?
Should it let the ide als of lib er al ism gain fur ther lat i tude, or or ches trate a
new round of di rig isme? The ex pe ri ences of the Yanukovych gov ern ment
of 2003-2004 show that mac ro eco nomic is sues are not re ally in the fo cus
of at ten tion. The cur rent gov ern ment em pha sizes cap i tal in vest ment of
the state, as op posed to com ple tion of the mar ket- struc tural trans for ma -
tion started in pre vi ous years, such as pro tec tion of pri vate prop erty, land
re form, con sol i da tion of the bank and money mar ket sec tors, and adop -
tion of mar ket mech a nisms in the wel fare sec tor. But with out these, the
state cap i tal in vest ments will tip the bal ance of the in vest ment mar kets
and, ul ti mately, could lead to ad verse eco nomic and so cial con se quences,
once again jeop ar diz ing the de vel op ment of Ukraine. Ukraine’s so cial and
eco nomic de vel op ment has been put on more in de pend ent foun da tions,
and con tin ues to show a high de gree of in sta bil ity. The un cer tainty is
caused by a com plex set of sub jec tive and ob jec tive fac tors. Among these
fac tors are the fol low ing things. Yanukovych dis plays a lack of au ton omy
and per sonal at trac tion. Pres i dent Uschenko is lack ing the ap pro pri ate
will power and sup port as a leader, al though he is cer tainly “com mit ted” to
na tional in ter ests. The po lit i cal arena is grad u ally split ting into two poles,
headed by Yanu ko vych and Tymoshenko. The “third power” that would
en sure the bal ance of in ter ests may prove to be weak. The re main ing op -
tion is that those who con tinue play ing po lit i cal games will take ad van tage 
of the di vi sion of so ci ety.
We can once again put the ques tion: Where are you go ing, Ukraine?
Tak ing into ac count the re cent so cial dy nam ics one can as sert that the
near est de vel op ment of the so ci ety will be able to in di cate the most fa vor -
able an swer on this ba sic ques tion. 
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How ever, the po lit i cal out look of the pres i den tial party “Our Ukraine” is not very prom is ing. Orig -
i nally this started as a co ali tion or ga nized around Uschenko, but its in te grat ing in flu ence has de -
creased sig nif i cantly. Ow ing to that, this po lit i cal force started to bleed over and be merged into
other groups, con cen trated in the cen ter of the span of po lit i cal par ties.
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